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# RFC 9611

## Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Support for Per-Resource Child Security Associations (SAs)

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### Abstract

In order to increase the bandwidth of IPsec traffic between peers, this document defines one Notify Message Status Types and one Notify Message Error Types payload for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) to support the negotiation of multiple Child Security Associations (SAs) with the same Traffic Selectors used on different resources, such as CPUs.

The SA\_RESOURCE\_INFO notification is used to convey information that the negotiated Child SA and subsequent new Child SAs with the same Traffic Selectors are a logical group of Child SAs where most or all of the Child SAs are bound to a specific resource, such as a specific CPU. The TS\_MAX\_QUEUE notify conveys that the peer is unwilling to create more additional Child SAs for this particular negotiated Traffic Selector combination.

Using multiple Child SAs with the same Traffic Selectors has the benefit that each resource holding the Child SA has its own Sequence Number Counter, ensuring that CPUs don't have to synchronize their cryptographic state or disable their packet replay protection.

### Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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## 1. Introduction

Most IPsec implementations are currently limited to using one hardware queue or a single CPU resource for a Child SA. Running packet stream encryption in parallel can be done, but there is a bottleneck of different parts of the hardware locking or waiting to get their sequence number assigned for the packet being encrypted. The result is that a machine with many such resources is limited to using only one of these resources per Child SA. This severely limits the throughput that can be attained. For example, at the time of writing, an unencrypted link of 10 Gbps or more is commonly reduced to 2-5 Gbps when IPsec is used to encrypt the link using AES-GCM. By using the implementation specified in this document, aggregate throughput increased from 5Gbps using 1 CPU to 40-60 Gbps using 25-30 CPUs.

While this could be (partially) mitigated by setting up multiple narrowed Child SAs (for example, using Populate From Packet (PFP) as specified in IPsec architecture [RFC4301]), this IPsec feature would cause too many Child SAs (one per network flow) or too few Child SAs (one network flow used on multiple CPUs). PFP is also not widely implemented.

To make better use of multiple network queues and CPUs, it can be beneficial to negotiate and install multiple Child SAs with identical Traffic Selectors. IKEv2 [RFC7296] already allows installing multiple Child SAs with identical Traffic Selectors, but it offers no method to indicate that the additional Child SA is being requested for performance increase reasons and is restricted to some resource (queue or CPU).

When an IKEv2 peer is receiving more additional Child SAs for a single set of Traffic Selectors than it is willing to create, it can return an error notify of TS\_MAX\_QUEUE.

### 1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

### 1.2. Terminology

This document uses the following terms defined in IKEv2 [RFC7296]: Notification Data, Traffic Selector (TS), Traffic Selector initiator (TSi), Traffic Selector responder (TSr), Child SA, Configuration Payload (CP), IKE SA, CREATE\_CHILD\_SA, and NO\_ADDITIONAL\_SAS.

This document also uses the following terms defined in [RFC4301]: Security Policy Database (SPD), SA.

## 2. Performance Bottlenecks

There are several pragmatic reasons why most implementations must restrict a Child Security Association (SA) to a single specific hardware resource. A primary limitation arises from the challenges associated with sharing cryptographic states, counters, and sequence numbers among multiple CPUs. When these CPUs attempt to simultaneously utilize shared states, it becomes impractical to do so without incurring a significant performance penalty. It is necessary to negotiate and establish multiple Child SAs with identical Traffic Selector initiator (TSi) and Traffic Selector responder (TSr) on a per-resource basis.

## 3. Negotiation of Resource-Specific Child SAs

An initial IKEv2 exchange is used to set up an IKE SA and the initial Child SA. If multiple Child SAs with the same Traffic Selectors that are bound to a single resource are desired, the initiator will add the SA\_RESOURCE\_INFO notify payload to the Exchange negotiating the Child SA (e.g., IKE\_AUTH or CREATE\_CHILD\_SA). If this initial Child SA will be tied to a specific resource, it **MAY** indicate this by including an identifier in the Notification Data. A responder that is willing to have multiple Child SAs for the same Traffic Selectors will respond by also adding the SA\_RESOURCE\_INFO notify payload in which it **MAY** add a non-zero Notification Data.

Additional resource-specific Child SAs are negotiated as regular Child SAs using the CREATE\_CHILD\_SA exchange and are similarly identified by an accompanying SA\_RESOURCE\_INFO notification.

Upon installation, each resource-specific Child SA is associated with an additional local selector, such as the CPU. These resource-specific Child SAs **MUST** be negotiated with identical Child SA properties that were negotiated for the initial Child SA. This includes cryptographic algorithms, Traffic Selectors, Mode (e.g., transport mode), compression usage, etc. However, each Child SA does have its own keying material that is individually derived according to the regular IKEv2 process. The SA\_RESOURCE\_INFO notify payload **MAY** be empty or **MAY** contain some identifying data. This identifying data **SHOULD** be a unique identifier within all the Child SAs with the same TS payloads, and the peer **MUST** only use it for debugging purposes.

Additional Child SAs can be started on demand or can be started all at once. Peers may also delete specific per-resource Child SAs if they deem the associated resource to be idle.

During the CREATE\_CHILD\_SA rekey for the Child SA, the SA\_RESOURCE\_INFO notification **MAY** be included, but regardless of whether or not it is included, the rekeyed Child SA should be bound to the same resource(s) as the Child SA that is being rekeyed.

## 4. Implementation Considerations

There are various considerations that an implementation can use to determine the best procedure to install multiple Child SAs.

A simple procedure could be to install one additional Child SA on each CPU. An implementation can ensure that one Child SA can be used by all CPUs, so that while negotiating a new per-CPU Child SA, which typically takes 1 RTT delay, the CPU with no CPU-specific Child SA can still encrypt its packets using the Child SA that is available for all CPUs. Alternatively, if an implementation finds it needs to encrypt a packet but the current CPU does not have the resources to encrypt this packet, it can relay that packet to a specific CPU that does have the capability to encrypt the packet, although this will come with a performance penalty.

Performing per-CPU Child SA negotiations can result in both peers initiating additional Child SAs simultaneously. This is especially likely if per-CPU Child SAs are triggered by individual SADB\_ACQUIRE messages [RFC2367]. Responders should install the additional Child SA on a CPU with the least amount of additional Child SAs for this TSi/TSr pair.

When the number of queue or CPU resources are different between the peers, the peer with the least amount of resources may decide to not install a second outbound Child SA for the same resource, as it will never use it to send traffic. However, it must install all inbound Child SAs because it has committed to receiving traffic on these negotiated Child SAs.

If per-CPU packet trigger (e.g., SADB\_ACQUIRE) messages are implemented (see Section 6), the Traffic Selector (TSi) entry containing the information of the trigger packet should be included in the TS set similarly to regular Child SAs as specified in IKEv2 [RFC7296], Section 2.9. Based on the trigger TSi entry, an implementation can select the most optimal target CPU to install the additional Child SA on. For example, if the trigger packet was for a TCP destination to port 25 (SMTP), it might be able to install the Child SA on the CPU that is also running the mail server process. Trigger packet Traffic Selectors are documented in IKEv2 [RFC7296], Section 2.9.


As per IKEv2, rekeying a Child SA **SHOULD** use the same (or wider) Traffic Selectors to ensure that the new Child SA covers everything that the rekeyed Child SA covers. This includes Traffic Selectors negotiated via Configuration Payloads such as INTERNAL\_IP4\_ADDRESS, which may use the original wide TS set or use the narrowed TS set.

## 5. Payload Format

The Notify Payload format is defined in IKEv2 [RFC7296], Section 3.10, and is copied here for convenience.

All multi-octet fields representing integers are laid out in big endian order (also known as "most significant byte first", or "network byte order").

### 5.1. SA\_RESOURCE\_INFO Notify Message Status Type Payload



(C)ritical flag - **MUST** be 0.


Protocol ID (1 octet) - **MUST** be 0. **MUST** be ignored if not 0.

SPI Size (1 octet) - **MUST** be 0. **MUST** be ignored if not 0.

Notify Status Message Type value (2 octets) - set to 16444.

Resource Identifier (optional) - This opaque data may be set to convey the local identity of the resource.

### 5.2. TS\_MAX\_QUEUE Notify Message Error Type Payload



(C)ritical flag - **MUST** be 0.

Protocol ID (1 octet) - **MUST** be 0. **MUST** be ignored if not 0.

SPI Size (1 octet) - **MUST** be 0. **MUST** be ignored if not 0.

Notify Message Error Type (2 octets) - set to 48.

There is no data associated with this Notify type.

## 6. Operational Considerations

Implementations supporting per-CPU SAs **SHOULD** extend their local SPD selector, and the mechanism of on-demand negotiation that is triggered by traffic to include a CPU (or queue) identifier in their packet trigger (e.g., SADB\_ACQUIRE) message from the SPD to the IKE daemon. An implementation that does not support receiving per-CPU packet trigger messages **MAY** initiate all its Child SAs immediately upon receiving the (only) packet trigger message it will receive from the IPsec stack. Such an implementation also needs to be careful when receiving a Delete Notify request for a per-CPU Child SA, as it has no method to detect when it should bring up such a per-CPU Child SA again later. Also, bringing the deleted per-CPU Child SA up again immediately after receiving the Delete Notify might cause an infinite loop between the peers. Another issue with not bringing up all its per-CPU Child SAs is that if the peer acts similarly, the two peers might end up with only the first Child SA without ever activating any per-CPU Child SAs. It is therefore **RECOMMENDED** to implement per-CPU packet trigger messages.

Peers **SHOULD** be flexible with the maximum number of Child SAs they allow for a given TSi/TSr combination in order to account for corner cases. For example, during Child SA rekeying, there might be a large number of additional Child SAs created before the old Child SAs are torn down. Similarly, when using on-demand Child SAs, both ends could trigger multiple Child SA requests as the initial packet causing the Child SA negotiation might have been transported to the peer via the first Child SA, where its reply packet might also trigger an on-demand Child SA negotiation to start. As additional Child SAs consume little additional resources, allowing at the very least double the number of available CPUs is **RECOMMENDED**. An implementation **MAY** allow unlimited additional Child SAs and only limit this number based on its generic resource protection strategies that are used to require COOKIES or refuse new IKE or Child SA negotiations. Although having a very large number (e.g., hundreds or thousands) of SAs may slow down per-packet SAD lookup.

Implementations might support dynamically moving a per-CPU Child SA from one CPU to another CPU. If this method is supported, implementations must be careful to move both the inbound and outbound SAs. If the IPsec endpoint is a gateway, it can move the inbound SA and outbound SA independently of each other. It is likely that for a gateway, IPsec traffic would be asymmetric. If the IPsec endpoint is the same host responsible for generating the traffic, the inbound and outbound SAs **SHOULD** remain as a pair on the same CPU. If a host previously skipped installing an outbound SA because it would be an unused duplicate outbound SA, it will have to create and add the previously skipped outbound SA to the SAD with the new CPU ID. The inbound SA may not have a CPU ID in the SAD. Adding the outbound SA to the SAD requires access to the key material, whereas updating the CPU selector on an existing outbound SAs might not require access to key material. To support this, the IKE software might have to hold on to the key material longer than it normally would, as it might actively attempt to destroy key material from memory that the IKE daemon no longer needs access to.

An implementation that does not accept any further resource-specific Child SAs **MUST NOT** return the NO\_ADDITIONAL\_SAS error because it could be misinterpreted by the peer to mean that no other Child SA with a different TSi and/or TSr is allowed either.

## 7. Security Considerations

Similar to how an implementation should limit the number of half-open SAs to limit the impact of a denial-of-service attack, it is **RECOMMENDED** that an implementation limits the maximum number of additional Child SAs allowed per unique TSi/TSr.

Using multiple resource-specific child SAs makes sense for high-volume IPsec connections on IPsec gateway machines where the administrator has a trust relationship with the peer's administrator and abuse is unlikely and easily escalated to resolve.

This trust relationship is usually not present for the deployments of remote access VPNs, and allowing per-CPU Child SAs is **NOT RECOMMENDED** in these scenarios. Therefore, it is also **NOT RECOMMENDED** to allow per-CPU Child SAs by default.

The SA\_RESOURCE\_INFO notify contains an optional data payload that can be used by the peer to identify the Child SA belonging to a specific resource. Notification data **SHOULD NOT** be an identifier that can be used to gain information about the hardware. For example, using the CPU number itself as the identifier might give an attacker knowledge of which packets are handled by which CPU ID, and it might optimize a brute-force attack against the system.

## 8. IANA Considerations

IANA has registered one new value in the "IKEv2 Notify Message Status Types" registry.

Value	Notify Message Status Type	Reference
16444	SA_RESOURCE_INFO	RFC 9611

Table 1

IANA has registered one new value in the "IKEv2 Notify Message Error Types" registry.

Value	Notify Message Error Type	Reference
48	TS_MAX_QUEUE	RFC 9611

Table 2

## 9. References

### 9.1. Normative References

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