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RFC 9905

Deprecating the Use of SHA-1 in DNSSEC Signature Algorithms

Abstract

This document deprecates the use of the RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 algorithms for the creation of DNS Public Key (DNSKEY) and Resource Record Signature (RRSIG) records.

It updates RFCs 4034 and 5155 as it deprecates the use of these algorithms.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
1.1. Requirements Notation	2
2. Deprecating SHA-1 from DNSSEC Signatures and Delegation RRs	3
3. Security Considerations	3
4. Operational Considerations	3
5. IANA Considerations	3
6. Normative References	4
Acknowledgments	5
Authors' Addresses	5

1. Introduction

The security of the protection provided by the SHA-1 algorithm [RFC3174] has been slowly diminishing over time as various forms of attacks have weakened its cryptographic underpinning. DNSSEC [RFC9364] (originally defined in [RFC3110]) made extensive use of SHA-1, for example, as a cryptographic hash algorithm in Resource Record Signature (RRSIG) and Delegation Signer (DS) records. Since then, multiple other algorithms with stronger cryptographic strength have become widely available for DS records and for RRSIG and DNS Public Key (DNSKEY) records [RFC4034]. Operators are encouraged to consider switching to one of the recommended algorithms listed in the [DNSKEY-IANA] and [DS-IANA] tables, respectively. Further, support for validating SHA-1-based signatures has been removed from some systems. As a result, SHA-1 as part of a signature algorithm is no longer fully interoperable in the context of DNSSEC. As adequate alternatives exist, the use of SHA-1 is no longer advisable.

This document thus deprecates the use of RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 for DNS Security Algorithms.

1.1. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Deprecating SHA-1 from DNSSEC Signatures and Delegation RRs

The RSASHA1 [RFC4034] and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 [RFC5155] algorithms **MUST NOT** be used when creating DS records. Operators of validating resolvers **MUST** treat RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 DS records as insecure. If no other DS records of accepted cryptographic algorithms are available, the DNS records below the delegation point **MUST** be treated as insecure.

The RSASHA1 [RFC4034] and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 [RFC5155] algorithms **MUST NOT** be used when creating DNSKEY and RRSIG records. Validating resolver implementations ([RFC9499], Section 10) **MUST** continue to support validation using these algorithms as they are diminishing in use but still actively in use for some domains as of this publication. Operators of validating resolvers **MUST** treat DNSSEC signing algorithms RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 as unsupported, rendering responses insecure if they cannot be validated by other supported signing algorithms.

3. Security Considerations

This document deprecates the use of RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 for DNSSEC Delegation and DNSSEC signing since these algorithms are no longer considered to be secure.

4. Operational Considerations

Zone owners currently making use of SHA-1-based algorithms should immediately roll to algorithms with stronger cryptographic algorithms, such as the recommended algorithms in the [DNSKEY-IANA] and [DS-IANA] tables.

Operators should take care when deploying software packages and operating systems that may have already removed support for the SHA-1 algorithm. In these situations, software may need to be manually built and deployed by an operator to continue supporting the required levels indicated by the "Use for DNSSEC Validation" and "Implement for DNSSEC Validation" columns, which this document is not changing.

5. IANA Considerations

IANA has set the "Use for DNSSEC Delegation" column of the "Digest Algorithms" registry [DS-IANA] [RFC9904] to **MUST NOT** for SHA-1 (1) and has added this document as a reference for the entry.

IANA has set the "Use for DNSSEC Signing" column of the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" registry [DNSKEY-IANA] [RFC9904] to **MUST NOT** for the RSASHA1 (5) and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 (7) algorithms and has added this document as a reference for these entries.

All other columns should remain as currently specified.

6. Normative References

- [DNSKEY-IANA] IANA, "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers", <<https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers>>.
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- [RFC9904] Hardaker, W. and W. Kumari, "DNSSEC Cryptographic Algorithm Recommendation Update Process", RFC 9904, DOI 10.17487/RFC9904, October 2025, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9904>>.

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